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Abstract: New cross-country evidence for 1965 to 1995 is presented on the link that runs from
population change to economic growth. The estimates indicate that demographic change is a
powerful determinant of income growth, operating mainly via the effect of changes in age
structure. The estimates also indicate that the benefits of demographic change can be greatly
magnified by a favourable policy environment. A case study of economic growth in Ireland
suggests that the legalisation of contraception in 1980 resulted in a sharp decline in fertility and
a sizeable increase in the relative share of the working-age population. This demographic shift,
operating in conjunction with a favourable policy environment, can explain in large measure the
birth of the Celtic Tiger. However, given demographic projections for Ireland, the Tiger’s roar may
become less formidable as it continues to mature.    
I INTRODUCTION
I
reland’s remarkable economic growth during the last decade has attracted
the attention of economists and development specialists around the world.
Many factors have been cited as contributing to this growth, including EU
membership and subsidies; increased exports; increases in foreign direct
investment (partly as a result of tax incentives); delayed convergence; good
macroeconomic management; increased levels of education; and a social
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Rosenberg for helpful assistance.contract between government, trade unions and employers (see, for example,
Barry (1999); Barry, Bradley and Hannan (2001); Burnham (2003); De la
Fuente and Vives (1997); Doyle (2001); Powell (2003); and Walsh (2000)). It
has also been suggested that part of the perceived growth is not real – that it
is an artefact of transfer pricing. Whatever the reasons, the country’s
impressive growth rate is clearly worthy of study. 
One explanation that has been insufficiently examined in the case of
Ireland, however, centres on the link between demographic change and
economic growth. Much of the thinking among economists and demographers
in past decades has been that population growth, in itself, has no effect on
economic growth. Dubbed “population neutralism,” this view has held sway in
the face of challenges from both “population optimists” and “population
pessimists”.
New research, in which the authors of this paper have been participants,
strongly suggests that there is, indeed, an important link between demo-
graphic change and economic growth. But what is important is not the
population growth rate, per se, but the changing age structure of the
population. All countries are at some stage of the “demographic transition”:
the movement from high rates of mortality and fertility to low rates. Since
declines in infant mortality generally precede declines in fertility the first part
of this transition is characterised by large cohorts of young people. When
fertility falls a “bulge” generation becomes a recognisable feature of the
population pyramid. When this generation reaches working age, and if it is
productively employed, a country will experience a demographically-induced
economic boost. 
Young (1994, 1995) in a detailed study of national accounts argued that
most of the economic growth in the East Asian “Tiger” economies was due to
the accumulation of factor inputs, particularly labour, rather than pure
productivity gains. Bloom, Canning and Malaney (2000) tie this surge in
labour supply to the demographic changes that took place in East Asia. In this
paper we propose that a similar mechanism has been at work in Ireland.
Fortin (2001) argues that increases in labour supply have played a large role
in the Irish economic boom; we argue that this labour supply boom has been
due mainly to demographic factors. Although Ireland has long had low
mortality rates, its birth rate, until relatively recently, was high for its level of
economic development. The relatively recent fall in its birth rate, starting in
1980, has given Ireland a “bulge” cohort of working-age people. We carry out a
cross-country analysis of growth rates over the period 1965 to 1995 and show
that the economic boom of the early 1990s was exactly what we would expect
given Ireland’s changing demographic structure.  
Moreover, we connect changes in family planning policy to the speeding up
230 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEWof the demographic transition in Ireland. As constraints on birth control began
to fall in the 1970s, and with its legalisation in 1979, Ireland’s fertility rate
began to fall faster than it had been. As the ensuing bulge generation began to
reach working age, Ireland’s economy took off.
While a part of Ireland’s phenomenal economic growth over the last decade
can be ascribed to demographic factors, it is clearly not the whole story. We
show in our cross-country model that the economic impact of the labour supply
surges that accompany the demographic transition is not automatic.
Countries, such as Ireland (and those of East Asia), that have a range of good
economic policies in place are able to take full advantage of demographic
changes while others, with poor policies in place, get little benefit. The
demographic dividend of greater labour supply is only a potential gain – this
labour has to be gainfully employed. A further complication occurs in the case
of Ireland. Large-scale migration means that the demography is to some
extent endogenous, with labour supply responding to, as well as leading,
economic growth. We try to identify the pure effect of exogenous demographic
changes on economic growth.  
This paper reviews these links between demographic change and economic
growth and explores the extent to which this emerging set of ideas can help us
understand Ireland’s economic performance over the last two decades. It also
leads us to predict high rates of growth in the current period but with a
slowdown in the Irish economy after 2005, when the ratio of working age to
total population will peak and the effect of population ageing starts to lead to
a less favourable demographic structure.
II THE EFFECTS OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE ON 
ECONOMIC GROWTH
There is a sizeable literature on the effect of population growth on
economic growth. Although it is often argued that rapid population growth has
a negative effect on the growth rate of income per capita, compelling evidence
on this point has been rather elusive and counterarguments abound. Most
studies find little cross-country evidence of a significant effect, holding
constant myriad other influences on the rate of economic growth. Whether this
result reflects the true unimportance of population growth, offsetting negative
and positive influences of population growth on economic growth, inadequate
control variables or other model specification errors, poor data, or reverse
causality, continue to be open questions. Nonetheless, this body of empirical
research has tended to support what has come to be known as the population
neutralist view: population growth neither systematically impedes nor
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in this area since the early 1980s and contributed to the marginalisation of
population and reproductive health as an instrument of economic development
among key development agencies like the World Bank. (See Ahlburg (2002);
Birdsall, Kelley and Sinding (2001); Bloom, Canning and Sevilla (2003); Kelley
(1988, 2001); and Kelley and Schmidt (2001)). 
New evidence and thinking has emerged in the past few years that
challenges, and is beginning to unseat, this longstanding view. This new
evidence relates to the importance of population age distribution in the
determination of macroeconomic performance. 
There are two main ideas here. The first is that people’s economic needs
and contributions vary over their life cycle. For example, young people tend to
be net consumers, while working-age people tend to be net producers and
savers, with the elderly falling somewhere in between. This implies that the
age structure of a population may be very consequential for its economic
performance – as measured by income per capita. Large youth and elderly
cohorts might slow down the pace of economic growth, while large working-age
cohorts might speed it up. 
The second idea is that not just population growth, but also changes in the
age structure of the population, are consequences of the well-established and
widely prevalent phenomenon known as the demographic transition. The
characteristic feature of this transition from high rates of fertility and
mortality to low rates is that the decline in mortality occurs before the decline
in fertility. The lag causes population growth, but initially it also swells the
youth share of the population since the mortality declines tend to be
disproportionately experienced by infants and children. The swelling goes
down subsequently as fertility rates decline. It shows itself as a pronounced
“bulge” in the age structure, and operates over time as a “demographic wave”
that works its way from the base to the apex of the population pyramid.  
In recent years, economists have integrated these observations about age
structure and life cycle into modern frameworks for studying economic growth.
Contrary to the neutralist view, the emerging evidence indicates that
population does matter to economic growth, with age structure playing a
central role. As the dependency ratio falls, opportunities for economic growth
tend to rise, creating what is now referred to as a “demographic dividend”. 
East Asia’s macroeconomic performance is tracked very closely by its
demographic transition and resulting changes in age structure. Estimates
indicate that as much as one-third of its “economic miracle” can be accounted
for as a “demographic dividend (Bloom and Williamson (1998), Bloom,
Canning, and Malaney (2000), and Mason (2001)). By contrast, the absence of
demographic change also accounts for a large portion of Africa’s economic
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Sachs and Warner (1997)). In addition, the introduction of demographics has
reduced the need for the argument that there was something exceptional
about East Asia or idiosyncratic to Africa. Once age structure dynamics are
introduced into an economic growth model, these regions are much closer to
obeying common principles of economic growth (Bloom and Canning (2001),
Bloom, Canning, and Malaney (2000). 
It is also clear, both theoretically and empirically, that there is nothing
automatic about the link from demographic change to economic growth (Bloom
and Canning (2001), Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla (2002); Bloom and Canning
(2003)). Age distribution changes merely create potential for economic growth.
Whether or not this potential is captured depends on the policy environment,
as reflected, for example, by the quality of governmental institutions, labour
legislation, macroeconomic management, openness to trade, and education
policy. This realm is where Latin America seems to have stumbled. During
1965 to 1990, its demographics resembled those of East Asia, but its economic
performance lagged well behind. Episodes of high inflation, political
instability, adversarial labour relations, and an inward orientation with
respect to trade through much of the period appear to have prevented many
Latin American countries from exploiting its demographic window of
opportunity, at least in its early phases.  On the other hand, Ireland appears
to have exactly the type of beneficial policy environment that enabled East
Asia to take full advantage of its demographic dividend. 
III THEORETICAL MODEL
Most empirical models of economic growth have focused on the growth of
income per capita. Income per capita is a convenient summary of the standard
of living and a useful measure of the level of economic development. However,
in theoretical terms, models of income growth usually rely on a production
function that links factor inputs and total factor productivity to output.
Dividing the production function through by labour gives us a relationship in
which output per worker is due to the level of inputs per worker and the
productivity with which inputs are used. Letting z0 be the initial level of
income per worker, we can write the growth rate of income per worker gz as   
gz = λ(z* – z0)
where z* is the steady state level of income per worker and λ is the speed of
convergence. The steady state level of income per worker depends on any
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productivity levels) that may affect labour productivity. We write the vector of
variables that can affect steady state labour productivity as X, which gives us
z* = Xβ and so
gz = λ(Xβ – z0)
This type of growth model is discussed extensively in Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1995). We now wish to develop a theory of the growth of income per
capita. We start with an accounting identity that links income per capita (Y/N)
to income per worker (Y/L)
Y     Y   L WA
— = — —– —–
N     L WA N
In this identity WA represents the population of working age. The identity
merely states that the level of income per capita equals the level of income per
worker times the participation rate (L/WA) times the ratio of working age to
total population (WA/N). In growth rate terms this implies that 
gY/N = gY/L + gL/WA +gWA/N
and making the following substitutions, 
Y               Y                L WA
y = log —,  z = log —,  p = log –—,  c = log —–, 
N               L WA N
we can derive
gy = gz + gp + gc
Hence we have (since y0 = z0 + p0 + c0) 
gy = λ(Xβ + p0 + c0 – y0) + gp + gc
This final equation is similar in form to the normal regressions run in
growth theory. It relates growth in output per capita to a range of variables,
X, and the initial level of income per capita, y0. However, several other terms
appear. The participation rate and the ratio of workers to total population
appear both in level terms and in growth terms. Due to the identity used to
derive this regression, the coefficients on these terms are fixed (equal to λ, or
minus the coefficient on initial income per capita for the level terms and equal
to one for the growth terms).  
234 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEWIV DATA
We construct a panel of countries observed every five years from 1960 to
1995. Data on GDP per capita are obtained from the Penn World Tables
version 6.0 (this data is an update of Summers and Heston (1991)). We
measure a country’s labour supply by the size of its economically active
population using data from the International Labour Office (1997). This
labour supply measure does not adjust for unemployment or for hours worked.
Data on the working age (those 15 to 64 years old) and total population come
from the United Nations (1998). 
In addition to these variables, we include in our regressions a number of
indicators that explain why labour productivity varies across countries (the
variables in our vector X in the theory section above). Schooling is measured
by the average total years of schooling of the population aged 15 years and
older from Barro and Lee (2000). Life expectancy data are from the United
Nations (1998). We use these as a proxy for the health of the workforce, even
though they measure mortality rates rather than morbidity. Higher life
expectancy is generally associated with better health status and lower
morbidity (Murray and Chen, 1992; Murray and Lopez, 1997). Schooling and
health can be thought of as indicators of the quality of labour.
We also include a range of geographic and institutional factors that may
affect factor productivity. Our governance variable is based on the index
created by Knack and Keefer (1995), which gives an average indicator of the
quality of public institutions. The index is based on data for 1982 and does not
vary within a country over the period we analyse. Data on the percentage of
land area in the tropics and a dummy for being landlocked come from Gallup,
Sachs, and Mellinger (1999). We include some country-specific variables that
may affect the long run level of total factor productivity. We also use a measure
of ethno-linguistic fractionalisation from Easterly and Levine (1997), and the
Sachs and Warner (1995) measure of openness to trade (which also depends on
a country’s market institutions to some extent). 
VE MPIRICAL RESULTS
We explain growth in per capita output in the five-year period by a fairly
standard set of explanatory variables but adding our demographic variables,
for a panel of countries over the period 1965-1995. The results are reported in
Table 1. In column 1 we report the results of estimating the relationship by
ordinary least squares. We find that open economies, with good institutions,
that have fairly homogeneous populations (i.e., low ethno-linguistic
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being landlocked, or being located in the tropics, is not statistically significant.
The average years of schooling of the workforce did not appear to be significant
either, though better health in the form of higher life expectancy did have a
significant positive effect on growth. The coefficient on the initial level of
income per capita was negative, indicating catch-up to a steady state defined
by the other variables as set out in the theory section.




Constant 0.715*** 0.757*** 0.619***
(0.173) (0.175) (0.186)
Openness 0.071*** 0.068*** 0. 024
(0.017) (0.017) (0.024)
Institutional Quality 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.014**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Ethno-linguistic Fractionalisation –0.051* –0.050* –0.053*
(0.028) (0.028) (0.029)
Landlocked 0.006 0.008 0.011
(0.018) (0.018) (0.021)
Tropical Area  –0.011 –0.018 –0.019
(0.020) (0.022) (0.024)
Initial average years of schooling –0.0003 –0.0007 –0.0009
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Initial Life Expectancy 0.004*** 0.004** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Log initial income per capita  –0.112*** –0.110*** –0.114***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
Log initial working age over total pop 0.257** 0.284** 0.180
(0.118) (0.125) (0.143)
Log initial participation rate –0.186*** –0.166*** –0.164***
(0.058) (0.058) (0.062)
Growth of participation rate  –0.570* –0.280 –0.212
(0.302) (0.527) (0.560)
Growth of working age over total pop 0.789** 1.222** –0.793
(0.329) (0.575) (0.973)
Growth of working age times openness 3.328***
(1.184)
R squared 0.309 0.306 0.270
Note: Based on 507 observations, from five year panel of countries, over the period 1965-1995.
Time dummies included but not reported. Heteroskedastic consistent standard errors in
parentheses. 
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population has a positive and significant sign as expected but the initial
participation rate has a negative sign. In terms of growth rates, the growth of
the ratio of working-age to total population has a positive sign while the
growth in the participation rate again has a negative sign. 
One issue with these results is that most of the explanatory variables are
measured at the start of the five-year period and therefore are prior to the
economic growth being explained. However, the growth in the participation
rate and the ratio working-age to total population are contemporaneous with
the economic growth being explained and as such possibly endogenous. It
seems quite reasonable to expect high periods of economic growth to induce
higher participation rates and perhaps, through in-migration, a higher ratio of
working-age to total population. To try to control for this potential endogeneity
we repeat the regression shown in column 1 but instrument these two growth
rates with their lagged values (from the previous five-year period). The
results, shown in column 2, do not change much except that now the growth
in the participation rate is no longer significant.
The results on the demographic variables in Table 1 are, at first sight,
difficult to interpret. Since their inclusion comes from an identity (see the
theory section above) we could actually exclude them from the estimation and
impose the parameters directly from the identity. However, there is a good
reason for estimating their effect; our model may suffer from omitted variable
bias. Increases in the participation rate, and the ratio of working-age to total
population, increase the labour force. Provided the measures of human capital
(such as health and education) in our model capture any changes in the
quality of the labour force during this inflow of workers, the coefficients from
the identity are correct. However, it seems likely that large expansions of the
labour force lead to changes in average quality in ways we do not measure. We
estimate, rather than impose, the coefficients on our demographic variables
allowing these labour quality effects are included in our estimates.
For the ratio of working-age to total population, the coefficients in Table 1
(columns 1 and 2) are in line with what we expect from our model. The
coefficient on the growth rate is close to one, while the coefficient on the initial
level is close in magnitude (though opposite in sign) to that on the initial level
of income per capita. For the participation rate, however, the effects seem to
go in the wrong direction with higher levels of labour market participation
being associated with lower levels of steady-state income.
One reason for this anomaly may be that participation rates tend to be
very high (close to 100 per cent) in very poor countries and to fall with the level
of development (to around 50 per cent). Only in the most developed countries
do we find higher levels of participation (essentially increases in female
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high levels of participation are acting as a proxy for some unobserved variable
that is linked to low levels of income, and low income growth, in our data. 
The effect of increases in the working-age population on labour supply is
to give a supply-side boost to potential output. However, the availability of
extra workers will have little effect if they are not employed. In column 3 of
Table 1 we report estimates of the parameters of a regression model that is
specified to include an interaction effect between the ratio of working-age to
total population and the degree of openness of the economy. This allows us to
test whether the effect of increasing the working-age ratio depends on the
flexibility of the economy as measured by its openness. 
We find a large positive coefficient on this interaction term, indicating that
a completely open economy (openness equal to one in our measure) will enjoy
about three times the impact of demographic change as compared with an
average country as modelled in column 2. In addition, the results in column 3
indicate that a country with a closed economy (openness equal to zero) will
have no gain from the demographic change (the coefficient on the growth in
the working-age ratio in column 3 is negative but not statistically different
from zero). This indicates that the impact of demographic change may be to
increase labour supply but how well this extra supply of workers is put to
productive employment depends on the economic system and policies being
used.   
VI CASE STUDY OF IRELAND
Ireland had been slow to complete the demographic transition. The death
rate in Ireland, which drifted down only slightly during the period 1950-2000,
has been relatively low by international standards (in the neighbourhood of 10
per thousand) and comparable to the rest of Europe. By contrast, the birth rate
was much higher through the early 1980s (over 20 per thousand). Indeed,
Ireland has long been seen as a demographic outlier within Europe, since its
fertility rate was still moderately high when other European countries had
fallen to near, or below, replacement level. Figure 1 shows the total fertility
rate in Ireland compared with the United Kingdom; comparisons with other
European countries would look very similar. The difference between a high
birth rate and a low death rate would have led to rapid population growth
were it not for Ireland’s historically high rate of out-migration. 
One reason for Ireland’s high fertility rate was undoubtedly the legal ban
on the use of contraception. From the founding of the Irish State in 1922 until
1979, Ireland placed severe restrictions on access to contraception,
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women and some medical institutions resisted these restrictions and by the
late 1960s women were increasingly obtaining oral contraceptives under the
legally-acceptable guise of regulating their menstrual cycle. The Irish women’s
movement took up this issue and in 1973 the Irish Supreme Court ended the
ban on contraception by legalising the importation of contraceptives for
personal use; this change was not, however, formally legally implemented
until 1979 (see Murphy-Lawless and McCarthy, 1999). In that year, the sale of
contraceptives for use in family planning was made legal upon presentation of
a doctor’s prescription. From 1985 on contraceptives could be sold to all those
aged 18 and over without a prescription. Legalisation of contraception was not
a sudden or unexpected shock. It arose out of women’s struggles for
reproductive freedom and from Ireland’s gradual incorporation into a broader
cultural world in which contraception was widely available and sexual mores
were changing. Nevertheless, legalisation was important, as it codified
societal norms and, as suggested by the data, seems to have been tightly
connected to a rapid fall in fertility.
As a result of societal and legal changes regarding contraception, fertility
rates in Ireland began to decline in the 1970s. This decline accelerated in the
1980s and the crude birth rate fell sharply during that decade, from 21.0 per
thousand to 14.2 per thousand. 
Ireland’s falling birth rate led to falling youth dependency and a higher
share of working-age people. Figure 2 shows the ratio of the working age (15-
64) to the non-working age (<15 or >64) population in Ireland from 1950 to
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Figure 1: Total Fertility Rate, Ireland and UK2000 (and projected to 2050 using UN population projections). Comparative
data for East Asia and for the United Kingdom are also shown. It is clear from
this figure that the dependency burden (i.e., the reciprocal of the indicator in
Figure 2) in Ireland mirrored that in East Asia through the mid-1970s. At that
point, East Asia’s fertility transition, which had begun in the mid-1960s, was
well underway and its dependency burden was falling sharply. By contrast,
Ireland’s dependency burden shows signs of sharp decline by the latter portion
of the 1980s, as a consequence of a declining birth rate during the 1980s. By
the mid-1990s the dependency burden in Ireland had dropped to a level below
that in the United Kingdom.   
We hypothesise that Ireland’s rapidly falling fertility rate, in conjunction
with a constructive set of social, economic, and political policies, facilitated
rapid economic growth in Ireland, just as it did in East Asia. To begin we note
that from 1960 to 1990, the growth rate of income per capita in Ireland was
approximately 3.5 per cent per annum. In the 1990s, the growth rate jumped
to 5.8 per cent, which is well in excess of any other European economy, thereby
giving rise to the notion of the “Celtic Tiger.” This boost in the growth rate
coincides closely with the falling dependency rate in Ireland. Thus, the raw
data are consistent with the view that demographic change contributed to
Ireland’s economic surge in the 1990s. 
We explore this hypothesis further by comparing actual growth rates of




























Figure 2: Ratio, Working-Age to Non-Working-Age Populationincome per capita in Ireland to fitted growth rates from our estimated
econometric model reported in column 3 of Table 1. The results of this exercise
are reported in Figure 3. The model tracks the actual growth rates extremely
well in terms of growth rates changes. It also tracks the data reasonably well
in terms of growth rate levels, especially given the absence of fixed effects in
the model. The results do suggest, though, that Ireland’s economy may have
under-performed relative to its potential from 1965 to 1985. 
Figure 4 decomposes the fitted growth rate into three components. The
first component – represented by the solid line – is the catch-up effect, that is,
the change in income per capita that corresponds to the partial adjustment of
Ireland’s actual income to its steady-state income corresponding to our
estimate of the term
λ(Xβ + p0 + c0 – y0)
in the theory section above. The catch-up effect represents about 3.5
percentage points of growth in 1965, but declines to about 2.5 percentage
points by 1995 as Ireland’s income converges to its steady-state level. 
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Figure 3: GDP Per Capita Growth in IrelandThe second component – represented by the dotted line – is world income
growth. This component corresponds to the effect of the time dummy variables
that were included in the econometric specification (though they are not
reported in column 3 of Table 1). The pattern picks up the world economic
recession that occurred in the 1980-85 period, as well as the first phases of the
subsequent economic rebound. 
The final component – represented by the dashed line – is the estimated
effect of changing age structure. This effect was zero through the mid-1970s
and grew steadily to nearly 3 percentage points by the mid-1990s. Especially
notable is the fact that demographic change was estimated to be the largest
component of Ireland’s income growth in 1995.1
Economic growth in Ireland was also fueled by two additional
demography-based factors that increased labour supply per capita. The period
1980–2000 saw a substantial increase in female labour force participation
rates, particularly in the 25-40 year old age group (see Figure 5). While one
would expect rapid economic growth to encourage female labour participation,
it seems likely that at least some of the increase was due to the availability of
contraception and the increased freedom of women to choose between working
and rearing children. In addition, Ireland has historically had high levels of
outward migration of young adults (around 1 per cent of the population per
year) due to the inability of its economy to absorb the large inflows of young
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Figure 4: Sources of Growth in Ireland
1 It should be noted that over half of the estimated effect (in Figure 4) of demographic change on
Ireland’s economic growth comes from the positive interaction of demographic change and
openness. workers created by its high fertility rate. The loss of these young workers of
course exacerbated the problem of the high youth dependency rate. The
economic growth of the 1990s created enough jobs to reverse this flow,
resulting in a small net immigration of workers, mainly from Eastern Europe. 
It is important to note that Ireland, like the “miracle” economies of East
Asia, had in place economic and social policies that favoured its taking
advantage of the demographic shifts it experienced. Two key policies were at
work in Ireland. First, in the late 1950s, there was recognition that the “closed
economy” model of development had failed in Ireland. This led to new policies
with an emphasis on encouraging direct foreign investment in Ireland and
promoting exports. Second, from the mid-1960s, free secondary education was
introduced, leading to a large increase in school enrolments and subsequent
expansions in higher education. The resultant high levels of education,
combined with export-oriented economic policies, seem to be powerful factors
in ensuring that the benefits of the demographic transition are realised. As
discussed in the introduction, there are a wide range of policies that have
contributed to Ireland’s economic growth. We think these policies also made
the Irish economy more flexible and capable of absorbing, and profiting from,
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Figure 5: Female Labour Force Participation in Irelandthe demographic dividend. In our empirical study we use “openness” as a
measure that affects the impact of the demographic dividend, but we see
“openness” more as a proxy for good economic policies in general and not an
endorsement of export orientation alone (see Bloom and Canning, 2003). 
Finally, we note that our estimates suggest that Ireland’s demographic
window of opportunity has reached a turning point and will soon begin to
close. For example, whereas Ireland’s working age population grew nearly 2.5
times faster than its total population after the legalisation of contraception
(1.24 per cent per year vs. 0.56 per cent per year during 1980 to 2000), it is
projected to grow at only three-fourths the rate of the total population during
the next twenty years (0.73 per cent vs. 0.95 per cent). The contribution of age
structure changes to economic growth will diminish steadily and turn negative
around 2005 (see Figure 2), and remain negative during 2010 to 2020. Looking
ahead, unless the in-migration of workers accelerates in pace, Ireland’s
demographic dividend may well turn into a case of demographic drag.
VII CONCLUSION
The economic strength of the Celtic Tiger has been the subject of
admiration and investigation from many quarters. In this paper, we have
drawn attention to two factors that may underlie the Tiger’s success and that
have not yet received much attention. First, the legalisation of contraception
appears to have given greater impetus to the decline in fertility. As we have
noted, this decline was occurring in any case, but it apparently received a
boost when increasingly common practices were legalised. Second, this rapid
fertility decline gave rise to a dramatic rise in the share of working-age people
in the population. This rise, although not quite as stunning as that in East
Asia, had the effect of accelerating Ireland’s economic growth – an effect that
was made possible by the sound policy environment the Irish government had
put in place.  
What does demography bode for the future economic success of Ireland?
The share of working-age people in the population is projected to reach a peak
in 2005, and to decline rather quickly thereafter, staying negative throughout
the following decade. Whether the “Celtic Tiger” can sustain itself or will later
be identified as a transitory and relatively short-lived phenomenon (1990 to
2005) is not yet clear. Based on the estimates reported herein, however, it is
clear that Ireland’s changing demography and age structure have allowed
Ireland a rare opportunity to catch up with the leading developed countries.
Moreover, few economies in the world rival Ireland’s policy environment with
respect to its ability to capture the demographic dividend. The “Celtic Tiger”
244 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEWis not a miracle but, as in the case of the East Asian Tigers, the result of
several positive factors, including demographic change and a positive policy
environment, interacting to produce a burst of rapid economic growth. 
REFERENCES
AHLBURG, DENNIS A., 2002. “Does Population Matter?” Population and
Development Review, Vol. 28, No. 2.
BARRO, ROBERT and LEE JONG-WHA, 2000. “International Data on Educational
Attainment: Updates and Implications.” Working Paper No. 42. Harvard
University, Center for International Development, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
BARRO, ROBERT and XAVIER SALA-I-MARTIN, 1995. Economic Growth. New York:
McGraw-Hill.
BARRY, FRANK, (ed.), 1999. Understanding Ireland’s Economic Growth. New York: St.
Martin’s Press; London: Macmillan Press. 
BARRY, FRANK, JOHN BRADLEY and AOIFE HANNAN, 2001. “The Single Market,
the Structural Funds and Ireland’s Recent Economic Growth,” Journal of Common
Market Studies. Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 537-552.
BIRDSALL NANCY, ALLEN C. KELLEY and STEPHEN W. SINDING, (eds.), 2001.
Population Matters: Demography, Growth, and Poverty in the Developing World.
New York: Oxford University Press. 
BLOOM, DAVID E. and DAVID CANNING, 2001. “Demographic Change and Economic
Growth: The Role of Cumulative Causality,” in Nancy Birdsall, Allen C. Kelley, and
Stephen W. Sinding, (eds.), Population Matters: Demographic Change, Economic
Growth and Poverty in the Developing World. New York: Oxford University Press.
pp. 165-197.
BLOOM, DAVID E. and DAVID CANNING, 2003. “From Demographic Lift to
Economic Liftoff: The Case of Egypt,” Applied Population and Policy, forthcoming. 
BLOOM, DAVID E., DAVID CANNING and PIA MALANEY, 2000. “Demographic
Change and Economic Growth in Asia.” Population and Development Review, Vol.
26, pp. 257-90.
BLOOM, DAVID E., DAVID CANNING and JAYPEE SEVILLA, 2003. The
Demographic Dividend: A New Perspective on the Economic Consequences of
Population Change. Santa Monica, California: RAND, MR–1274.
BLOOM, DAVID E. and JEFFREY D. SACHS, 1998. “Geography, Demography and
Economic Growth in Africa”. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 2, pp.
207–95.
BLOOM, DAVID E. and JEFFREY G. WILLIAMSON, 1998. “Demographic Transitions
and Economic Miracles in Emerging Asia”. World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 12,
pp. 419–456.
BURNHAM, JAMES B., 2003. “Why Ireland Boomed”, Independent Review. Vol. 7, No.
4, pp. 537-556.
DE LA FUENTE, A. and X. VIVES, 1997. “The Sources of Irish Growth”, in Alan W.
Gray, (ed.), International perspectives on the Irish economy.  Public Policy Series.
Dublin: Indecon Economic Consultants, pp. 112-134.
CONTRACEPTION AND THE CELTIC TIGER 245DOYLE, E., 2001. “Export-Output Causality and the Role of Exports in Irish Growth:
1950-1997”. International Economic Journal. Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 31-54. 
EASTERLY, WILLIAM and ROSS LEVINE, 1997. “Africa’s Growth Tragedy: Policies
and Ethnic Divisions,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(4), November: pp.
1203-1250.
FORTIN, P., 2001. “The Irish Economic Boom: What Can We Learn?” International
Productivity Monitor, Vol. 3, pp. 19-31. 
GALLUP, JOHN L., JEFFREY D. SACHS and ANDREW MELLINGER, 1999.
“Geography and Economic Development.” International Regional Science Review
Vol. 22, pp. 179-232.
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, 1997. Economically Active Population, 1950-
2010. Geneva.
KELLEY ALLEN C., 2001. “The Population Debate in Historical Perspective:
Revisionism Revised”, in Nancy Birdsall, Allen C. Kelley, and Stephen W. Sinding,
(eds). Population Matters: Demographic Change, Economic Growth, and Poverty in
the Developing World. Oxford University Press. pp. 24–54. 
KELLEY, ALLEN C., 1988. “Economic Consequences of Population Change in the
Third World”. Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 27, pp. 1685–728.
KELLEY, ALLEN C. and ROBERT SCHMIDT, 2001. “Economic and Demographic
Change: A Synthesis of Models, Findings, and Perspectives.” in Nancy Birdsall,
Allen C. Kelley, and Stephen W. Sinding, (eds.), Population Matters: Demographic
Change, Economic Growth, and Poverty in the Developing World. Oxford
University Press.
MASON, ANDREW, (ed.), 2001. Population Change and Economic Development in East
Asia: Challenges Met, Opportunities Seized. California: Stanford University Press.
KNACK, STEPHEN and PHILIP KEEFER,  1995. “Institutions and Economic
Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures.”
Economics and Politics Vol. 7, pp. 207-227.
MURPHY-LAWLESS, JO and JAMES MCCARTHY, 1999. “Recent Fertility Change in
Ireland and the Future of Irish Fertility”, in Below Replacement Fertility,
Population Bulletin of the United Nations, Special Issue Nos. 40/41, 1999.
NewYork: United Nations: pp. 235-246. 
MURRAY, CHRISTOPHER J. L. and LINCOLN C. CHEN, 1992. “Understanding
Morbidity Change.” Population and Development Review Vol. 18, pp. 481-503.
MURRAY, CHRISTOPHER J. L., and ALAN D. LOPEZ, 1997. “Regional Patterns of
Disability-Free Life Expectancy and Disability Adjusted Life Expectancy: Global
Burden of Disease Study.” Lancet, Vol. 349, pp. 1347-1352. 
POWELL, B., 2003. Economic Freedom and Growth: The Case of the Celtic Tiger. Cato
Journal. Vol. 22, No. 3. pp 431-448.
SACHS, JEFFREY D., and ANDREW WARNER, 1995. “Economic Reform and the
Process of Global Integration”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol. 1, 
pp. 1-118, Washington: Brookings Institution.
SACHS, JEFFREY D. and ANDREW WARNER, 1997. Sources of slow growth in
African economies, Journal of African Economics, Vol. 6, pp. 335-337.
SUMMERS, ROBERT AND ALAN HESTON, 1991. “The Penn World Table (Mark 5):
An Expanded Set of International Comparisons, 1950-1988.” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, Vol. 106, pp. 327-368.
UNITED NATIONS, 1998. Demographic Indicators 1950-2050. New York.
246 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEWWALSH, BRENDAN, 2000. “Cyclical and Structural Influences on Irish Unemploy-
ment”. Oxford Economic Papers. Vol. 52, No. 1, pp. 119-145.
YOUNG, ALWYN. 1994. “Lessons from the East Asian NIC’s: A Contrarian View,”
European Economic Review, Vol. 38, pp. 964-973.
YOUNG, ALWYN. 1995. “The Tyranny of Numbers: Confronting the Statistical
Realities of the East Asian Growth Experience.” Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Vol. 110, pp. 641-880.
CONTRACEPTION AND THE CELTIC TIGER 247